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NOTES AND COMMENTS

would have required the federal court to grant relief on the substantive
issue not determined in the state court.
Now let us do as Justice Frankfurter did and combine res judicata
and the Erie doctrine. What is the result? By the use of res judicata
the constitutionality of the state statute as between the parties is settled.
It cannot be attacked in the federal court. By the use of the Erie doctrine the state policy of denying relief is to be followed if the state
statute establishing such policy is constitutional. But the constitutionality question having been determined by the application of res judicata
there is now no problem. The state policy enunciated by a "constitutional" statute is now applied in the federal court.
Hence, we see that the desired end of not allowing Bullington a
recovery in a federal court when he was denied the same in a state
court is attained only by utilizing both the doctrines of the Erie case
and res judicata.
CLAUDE F.

SEILA.

Declaratory Judgment-Trustees' Request for Instructions
The Elders of the First Presbyterian Church of Salisbury as the
trustees under a will probated in 1849, devising a certain plot of land
in Salisbury together with the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)
in trust for the church, came into the Superior Court of Rowan County
under the declaratory judgment act," asking for a declaration that they
had the power "to sell, mortgage, and/or lease" the property in view of
changed conditions. The trust instrument specifically withheld the power
of sale, and provided that if the trustees should fail or neglect to execute
the trust, then the property should go to Davidson College. The trustees
were to keep the property so improved that the rent would provide a
revenue for the church. Plaintiffs alleged the property was on the edge
of the business district in Salisbury and very much in demand by com-

mercial interests, but that they were financially unable to develop and
maintain it adequately. Trial court granted the relief requested. Held:
Reversed and case dismissed. Declaratory judgment inappropriate:
(1) plaintiff should have brought trustees' bill in equity for instructions,
for tle power of sale
(2) apparently the court felt that the request
2
would have invoked a forfeiture of the estate.
It is surprising to find the court refusing a declaratory judgment on
the first ground, for the declaratory action is an outgrowth.and extension
of the trustees' bill in equity for instructions. 3 Thus the court indicates
1

N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§1-253 et seq.
Brandis et al. v. Trustees of Davidson College et al., 227 N. C. 329, 41 S. E.

2d 833 (1947).
'Little v. Thorne, 93 N. C. 69 (1885) (under the equity jurisdiction of the
court, by a trustee's request for instructions, an executor or trustee may apply to
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its unwillingness to entertain the declaratory action merely because an
alternative remedy is available. 4 There has been a considerable amount
of controversy among the various American jurisdictions as to whether
or not the declaratory action should be entertained in such a situation.
The erroneous conception that it should not be0 has arisen in part from
confusion with the policy that a declaratory suit would not be permitted
where a special statutory proceeding has been provided. 7 This miscon8
ception has been cleared up in North Carolina.
The declaratory judgment was meant to be an alternative remedy, 9
to be used, in the court's discretion, either where no remedy existed,10
or where adequate but less appropriate remedies already existed either
at law or in equity." The point of the action is to provide anticipatory
relief without necessity of prior breach of duty. 12

Here the court de-

the court for advice in the management of the trust, but in such case the advice
of the court is given only upon an existing state of facts which calls for some
present action, and not in regard to future conduct upon a certain contingency);
BoaRcHAw, DEcLARATORY JUDGmENTS 144 (2d ed. 1941).
' Contra: Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930) (a specific remedy to enable legatees to obtain legacies without bond was viewed as not so exclusive as to deprive the legatee of the power to seek a declaration to like effect).
Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblin, 233 Ala. 6, 169 So. 2,34 (1936) (declaratory
judgment allowed) ; Lisbon Village District v. Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155 At. 252
(1931) (declaratory judgment refused); Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272
N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. 2d 829 (1936) (declaratory judgment allowed); Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 128 Misc. 232, 218 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926) (declaratory judgment refused); People's Park & Amusement Ass'n, Inc. v. Anrooney,
100 Wash. Dec. 43, 93 P. 2d 362 (1939) (declaratory judgment refused).
' See Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 199, 205, 242 N. W. 570, 572 (1932) ; Schmidt
v. La Salle Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 576, 580, 245 N. W. 702, 703 (1932) ("The
Declaratory judgments Act is an effort to provide a tribunal in which controversies
may be determined which could not otherwise be presented for determination."
[quoted in both cases]).
Compare Poore v, Poore, 201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931) (declaratory
judgment on validity of will not allowed before admission of will to probate),
with Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S. E. 784 (1938) (allowed declaratory judgment on will after its admission to probate); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Powell,
217 N. C. 495, 8.S. E. 2d 619 (1940),
8
See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth, 213 N. C. 576, 580, 197 S. E.
179, 181 (1938) ("In Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N. C. 642, 645, 153
S. E. 114, 116, citing authorities, it is said: 'It is well settled that an executor upon
whom the will casts the performance of a duty may, when he needs instruction,
bring a suit in equity tq obtain a construction of the will.' In re Estate of Mizzelle,
213 N. C. 367, 368, 196 S. E. 364. Plaintiff further has the right to maintain this
action under chapter 102, sec. 3, Public Laws of 1931, known as the 'Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act.' Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S. E.
784") ; see Allison v. Sharp, 209 N. C. 477, 481, 184 S. E. 27, 30 (1936) ("While
there was another remedy at law available to them, they have challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which they contend that the registrar refused
them registration. Under such circuinstances and conditions, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act affords a ready means of testing its validity,.
") [italics
supplied].
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-253.
10
1

2

N. C. GEN. STAT. '(1943) §§1-253, 1-254.
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-253.

Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments, 1939, 9 Bn6oKLYN L. Rzv. 1 (1939) (an address delivered before a meeting of the New York State Bar Association at Saranac
Inn on June 30, 1939, in which Prof. Borchard said: "It has already been noted
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mands the use of the trustees' bill for instructions, which would involve
almost identically the same proceedings, the same issues, and the same
relief. This is not in accord with the authorities 3 and is a reversion
to the holding of the court in the early days of applying the declaratory
judgment act; namely, that such an action would not lie merely because
other remedies, legal or equitable, already existed. 14
The court in refusing the declaratory judgment as being in excess
of the statutory authorization therefor cited one case in support, Tryon
v. Duke Power Co.' 5 The court in that instance gave as its reason for
dismissal the lack of a case or controversy. In the instant case, the
court may have felt that this was in reality an ex parte proceeding and
thus not cognizable under the declaratory judgment act.16 It is submitted that the possibility of forfeiture upon sale, mortgage or lease without judicial sanction, caused the interests of the parties to be sufficiently
adverse to constitute a case or controversy. 7 The trust instrument
expressly prohibits sale and provides for possible forfeiture to the college so that the interests of the church and the college are necessarily in
conflict. The fact of friendship between the parties (the college did
not appeal and was not represented by counsel in the Supreme Court),
cannot be said to vary their legal relations.' 8 And the trustees want to
sell in the immediate future, raising the controversy with the college
now. In Tryon v. Duke Power Co., the court in refusing a declaratory
judgment said, "The statute does not require the court to give a purely
advisory opinion which the parties might, so to speak, put. on ice to be
used if and when occasion might arise." There the petitioners wanted
the decision not for immediate application but rather to know what they
might do if they desired to invoke the judgment in the future. 19
that against a responsible defendant a declaration of his duty serves the same pur-

pose as a coinmand to perform it. Just what motive persuades a plaintiff to seek
the milder relief of declaration rather than the more drastic relief of coercion is
not always apparent. But the simplicity, the friendlier atmosphere, the escape
from technicalities, the narrowing of the issues, the inexpensiveness and the speed
would in most cases account for the election. In California, Michigan and Kentucky, declaratory actions go to the head of the calendar and the new Federal
Rules provide that 'the court may order a speedy hearing of an action foi a
declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.' [Rule 57]").
13 Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity, the Declaratory Action, 13 U. OF
CHi.L. REv. 158 (1946) (it appears that the rule that the declaratory action will

not be allowed where an alternative' remedy, legal or equitable, is available, today
exists only in Indiana).
*'Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38 (1932).
13222

N. C. 200, 22 S. E. 2d 450 (1942).

7 Ibid.; In re Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932).
BoRcHAR,, DECLARATORY JUDGM-NTS 927 (2d ed. 1941).
13

Accord, Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Inc. v. Trustees of Wake Forest
et al., 227 N. C. 500, 42 S. E. 2d 910 (1947) (the court had no difficulty in recognizing the existence of a case or controversy between friendly litigants seeking
the same judgment; namely, approval of contract between two groups of charitable
trustees).
"oSee note 15 supra. (At the time of bringing the declaratory action, the plain-
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As to the second ground for refusing a declaratory judgment, namely,
the court's feeling that the trustees' request amounts to an admission
of failure to execute the trust and the invocation of forfeiture, see Middleton v. Rigsbee.0 There, the court authorized the trustees to sell
part of the corpus in spite of specific provisions in the will to the contrary on the ground that if the testator had foreseen the practical situation, he would have permitted the sale in order to preserve the trust
and effectuate its purpose. This has frequently been done in situations
where the court finds such a sale necessary to the preservation of the
trust res.2 ' Although courts hesitate longer in giving the power to
mortgage, that would seem to have no bearing on the decision in this
case, for the court did not consider this aspect of the case, but based its
decision solely on the request for power of sale. True, there is a distinction between the present case and the Middleton case in the forfeiture
provision. There, the parties involved were the life tenant and remaindermen, all of whose interests could best be served by permitting sale
and thus preserving the res. Here, the provision for forfeiture to the
college if the trustees should fail or neglect to execute the trust or to
keep the property productive permits the contention that the interests of
the college would not best be served by granting a power of sale to the
trustees of the church. But this is the very determination for which
the trustees are seeking.
Though the petitioners may admit that they can no longer administer
the trust properly without sale, mortgage or lease, the request itself
cannot constitute a failure of administration. If the court feels that the
terms of the instrument are still binding, it can so decide. The situation
is one for which the declaratory action was specifically designed and
has been used before 22 and since23 in this jurisdiction. The decision
should be confined to its facts and not extended to other situations.
DANIEL

D.

RETCHIN.

tiffs did not contemplate acting in accordance with the decision but only desired
to determine whether they could apply a condemnation feature of a contract
against the defendants if they wanted to do this at any time in the future, but
there was no present'intention of such application, and so no case or controversy).
20 179 N. C. 437, 102 S. E. 780 (1920) ; accord, Cutter v. American Trust Co.,
213 N. C. 686, 197 S.E. 542 (1938); cf. in the Petition of the Equitable Trust
Co., 17 Del. Ch. 21, 147 Atl. 231 (1929) (trust instrument allowing sale of real
estate,

".

. . except the farm called Beauclerc Manor. . . ."

Sale of part of

manor allowed under statute empowering the court to permit sale of property held
in trust unless expressly prohibited by the creator of the trust [commented upon
favorably
Note, 30 COL. L. REv. 136 (1930)]).
1
In thein Petition
of the Equitable Trust Co., supra note 20.
22
N. C. Gm. STAT. (1943) §1-255; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth,
213 N. C. 576, 197 S.E. 179 (1938).
3 See note 18, supra.

